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Incidence Calculus and Dempster-Shafer Theory of
Evidence are both theories to describe agents’ de-
grees of belief in propositions, thus being appropri-
ate to represent uncertainty in reasoning systen~.
This paper presents a straightforward equivalence
proof between some special cases of the~e theories.
In this paper we present some equivalence proofs be-
tween these theories, when applied over finite propo-
sitional languages. This is made possible due to the
results presented by Fagin and Halpern in [3], and
the proofs are achievable through the use of a refor-
mulated version of Fagin and Haipern’s probability
structures.
2I
1 Introduction 2.1
Incidence Calculus [1,2,6] and Dempster-Shafer The*
ory of Evidence [3,5,8] are two alternative theories to
represent uncertain knowledge in reasoning systems.
They present a series of similarities:
I
!
Preliminary Definitions
Probability Space
Following [3], a probability space is a tuple
where $ is a sample space, X is a a-algebra of Si,
and/~ is a probability measure of
I
I
I
I
I
1. Both of them have been proposed as extensions
of the Bayesian approach.
2. Both of them have proposed intervd-based
probability extensions.
3. Both of them have considered a specific kind of
uncertainty, the probability assignment on pos-
sible worlds [4].
The main difference between them is that Dempster-
Sharer Theory of Evidence extends Bayesian Theory
by allowing possible ~#orlds udth undefined probability
mea~urss, whereas Incidence Calculus does so by al-
lowing propositio~ udth undefined truth assignments
on posdble worlds.
/~ : X "* [0, 1] such that
i..(s) = i
jolt
(~ X k finite, thk l~t prop~ty t~s to
~(x~ u~x,) = ~(x~) + ~(x~), x~ n x~ = ,
~d ~ows ~ to derive the foHow~g coroH~ies:
(a) /~(--X) = 1 - #(X)
Ithat is, X is a set of sub~ets of $ such that $ E X and X
is dosed under compl~nentation and countable union
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(b) ~(0) = O,
where ~ stands for the empty set)
The probability measure is defined only on ×, that is
a subset of the power set 2$ of ~. It can be extended
on 2s in a standard way, by defining the inner mea-
sure induced by
that, due to the codomain of the measure func-
tion and property 2., can be rewritten, for finite o-
algebras, as:
Given a o-algebra X, the subset X’ _~ X is called
a basis of X iff all members of X* are disjoint and
nonempty and X consists precisely of countable
unions of members of Xt. It is provable that if X
is finite then it has a basis [3].
3 Probability Structure
In [3] a probability structure is defined as a tuple
(5, X,~,~P), associated with a finite propositional
language At. (S, X,/~) is a probability spa~e and ~
is a truth-assignment mapping, that associates with
each s ~ $ a mapping u(s) : ~ --* [true, false).
Intuitively, each s corresponds to a possible world.
Alternatively, we define an incidence mapping i as
a specific formulation of the inverse mapping of ~r,
that is:
with the following properties:
I
I
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!
I
i
!
I
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2.2 Propositional Language 1. i(~) ----- {s ~ S : ~o is true in s}
~
2. ~(~) = 
The language we are going to consider is a finite
propositional language. It can be characterized by a
finite set of primitive propositions ~ = {p~, ...,pn)
and its closure under the application of the Boolean
operators A and --. The primitive propositions in
~ do not necessarily describe mutually exclusive
events. In order to have mutually exclusive events,
~ can be restated as the set At -- {8,, ..., ~), where
5~ -- p~A...Ap: andpi ffi PY or py =--py. If we
define the operator V in tern~ of A and -~ as usual,
then we can associate subsets ~o of At with formulae
in the propositional language generated by ~, con-
slated by the disjunction of the elements of
represents all the formulae generated by ~.
Fsgin and Halpern [3] assumed that all the formulae
generated by ~ h~ an interpretation, i.e., allowed a
truth assignment. We will a~ume that a o-algebra
~ of At has interpretations. Since 2A* is a o-algebra
of At, our a~umption include~ F~gin and Halpern’s
one.
Since @ is finite, a ~r-algebra g, _ 2At Of A~ wl]] be
a set such that:
3. i(A,) = ~
~. ~(-~) = s -~(~)
6. d(~ v ~) = i(~) u ~(~)
I
I
Thus, we re~tate a probability $tructure as a tu-
ple (S,X,D, At,,i), where (S,X,~) is a probability
space, At defines a propositional language,  is a
a-algebra of At and i is an incidence mapping.
4 Dempster-Shafer Structure
Given a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
atomic events, Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence
provide~ a way to attach degrees of belief on these
events by defining belief and plausibility functions.
We can formalise these concepts as tuples (O, bel),
where O is the set of atomic events and bel is the
bel~ef f~nctioa o~er O, that is:
I
I
!
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I
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bel : 2° -~ [0, I] such that
Observe that the right-hand side of property .3. cor-
responds to the inclusion-exclusion rule for probabil-
ities [3,71.
The associated plausibility function over @ derives
from the definition of the belief function:
Thus, to each event A we can associate a subset of
O and attach an interval [bel~{A),plb,(A)] to which
the probability of A belongs, where be/~ is the inf of
bel and plbs is the sup of plb.
In [3], a specific interpretation for Dempster.Sh~fer
Theory of Evidence is provided. The set (9 is in-
terpreted as a set of possible worlds, to which the
truth-evaluation of a finite propositional language is
associated. ~n that case, it is proved that to any tu-
ple (e, bel) there is another tuple (et, belt), in which
et is finite and the evaluations of belt and bel are
equal for any formula in the a~oclated propositional
language. It is also proved that to any tuple ((~, bel)
in which (~ is finite there is a corresponding proba-
bility structure (S, X,/~, At, 2At, i) in which the eval-
uations of bel and/~, are equal for any formula, pro-
vided that the propositional language is the same.
It is worth observing that S is also finite, in that
cameo
Thus, if we restrict our attention to Fagin and
Halpern’s interpretation and finite propositionM lan-
guages, we can take Dempster.$hafer structures as
probability structures (S, X, P, At, 2A*, i), in which
bel is the inner measure induced by p and $ is
nite.
We define Total Dempster-Shafer structures as tu-
plea (S,x,/~
, 
At, 2At,i) in which the image of the in-
cidence mapping contains the ~r-algebra of the prob-
ability structure, that is, for all X E X there ~s a
~o E 2~t such that i(~) = X. In other words, Total
Dempster-Shafer structures guarantee that all the
measurable sets of possible worlds refer to some for-
mula in the propositional language under consider-
ation.
5 Incidence Calculus Struc-
ture
Incidence Calculus [1,2,6] was proposed as an alter-
native way to attach a~d propagate degrees of belief
on propositions. Here we have, as before, a set S
of possible worlds, a probability measure associated
with sets of possible worlds and an incidence map-
ping from propositions of a propositional language
to possible worlds.
Differently from before, though, the probability
measure is defined on the whole power set 2s of
S - and the incidence mapping is defined only on
a generic ~-algebra of atomic propositions. These
concepts are captured by the probability structure
(S, 2s,/~, At, d~, i), where the symbols axe defined as
before.
The inference rules in the Legal Assignment Finder
procedure [1,2] extend the incidence mapping on all
formulae, by determining the sets of possible worlds
that would contain and the ones that would be con-
rained by those in which the formulae axe true. That
is, the incidence mapping is extended to lower and
upper evaluations as follows (respectively, i. and f*):
~.(~) = U[~’(~) : ~ -~ ~’, ~ ~ ~]
d*(~) = s - U[d(~) : ~ -~ ~,~,~ ~ ~1 = s - ~.(~).
~ ~ 2~tt
The probability of a formula ~ is then de-
fined, in general, as belonging to the interval[~(~. {~)), ~(~* {~))1.
6 Equivalence Relations Be- (a,x,~,~e,2~’,~) we define an Incidence Calculus
tween Dempster-Shafer and structure (~q~,2~’°,~,A~,~e,i~), where S~
~ = ~, ~c = {{~i} : i(~i) ~ si~,~i ~ At}, andIncidence Calculus Struc-
tures                                     Then we have that
Two probability structures (Si, Xi,
and (S2, X~,#~,At2,@2,i2) are said to be equiva-
lent ~t~ respect to a propositional language At iff
At ~ Atx, At ~ At~ and they define the s~e pro~
ab~ity ~te~al for eve~ fo~ula ~ 2At.
There is a correspondence between Total Dempster-
Sharer structures and Incidence Calculus structures
- that is, there is an association of an equivalent
Total Dempster-Shafer structure to each Incidence
Calculus structure, and vice-versa. Intuitively, it
means that (Incidence Calculus) probability 5ound.
aries over propositions cam be "translated" into
(Dempster-Shafer) proability boundaries over pos-
sible worlds and vice-versa. Formally, these state.
ments can be presented and proved as below:
Theorem 6.1
For every Incidence Calculus Probabil-
ity Structure there i~ an equivalent Total
Dempster.Shafer Probability Structure.
Proof: Given any Incidence Calculus structure
(S, 2s,#,At,¢,i), we define a Total Dempster-
Shafer structure (At,~b,l~b,At,2A*,id,), where
/~d, (~) = p(i(~o)), and i& i~ an identity function.
Then we have that
~(U ~, : ~, _c -~t, ~ a ~) =
= 1 -- p(i.(--~)) = 1 - bel(-.~) = plb(~).
QED
Theorem 6.2
For e~e~ Total Dempster.$hafer Prob.
abdity Structure there is an equivalent In.
cidence ~alc~lus Probability3 Strt;cture.
Proof.. Given a Total Dempster-Shafer structure
I
I
~o(i.(-t)) =
= ~o(s - i.(~)) = ~,o(~*(-~)).
QED
I
I
7 Example !
As an example, one problem is solved by using equiv-
alent structures belonging to each theory. The prob-
lem is the one presented in [3] - example 2.2, and
stated here as follows:
I
I
A person has four coats: two are
blue and single-breasted, one is grey and
double-breasted and one is grey and single-
breasted. To choose which color of coat
this person is going to wear, one tosses
a (fair) coin. Once the colour is chosen,
to choose which specific coat to wear the
person uses a mysterious nondeterministic
procedure which we don’t know anything
about. What is the probability of the per-
son wearing a single-breasted coat?
7.1 Dempster-Shafer Solution
Let Sd, = {sl,~2, sa,s4}, where ex and s2 corre-
spond to the wearing of blue coats, ss corresponds
to the wearing of the grey single-breasted coat and
si corresponds to the wearing of the grey double-
breasted one.
Let 4~ --- {g, d}, corresponding respectively to "the
coat is grey" and "the coat is double-breasted".
I
I
i
I
I
I
I
I
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Then we have
~tt = {g A a, ~g A d, ~g A -~d, g A -~d},
~({81,~}) = ~({~,~}) = 0.s, ~(~}) =
0, ~({s}) = z.
Observe that th~ st~ct~e ~ totM.
The des~ed answer,
,(~(~a)) = ,({~, ~, ~}),
is unde6ned. The lower and upper bounds for th~ 8
value ~e:
~(~) = ..(~(~a)) = ~.({~,~,~}) =
.({~, ~}) = 0.s,
~(~d) = z-~.(d(~)) = ~-~.({~.}) = z-.(~) = z.
It means that, although we have no me~s to eval-
uate the probabi~ty of the person to we~ a s~gle-
bre~ted coat, we know that it ~ not sm~Uer than
0.5.
7.2 Incidence Calculus Solution
To solve the saxne problem using Incidence Calcu-
lus, instead of constructing a set of possible worlds
- some of which being nonmeasurable - with each
one corresponding to one possible situation, we con-
struct a set of possible worlds with each one corre-
sponding to one measurable situation, that may be a
set of subsets of the formerly considered situations.
For example, let’s construct an Incidence Calculus
structure by applying the procedure pointed out in
Theorem 6.2 on the formulation of section 7.1:
Let Si~ = {w1,~2}, where ~/~i and tv~ correspond
to the possible worlds in which the blue and grey
coats are worn, respectively. This is the basis of
Let ,I, and At be as before. Now,
~) v (g A ~) v (~ A ~), AO,
and .({=i}) = .({==}) = 0.S, .(~}) = 0,.({S}) =
1.
The desired answer, ~({(-~d)) = ~,(~((-~g ^-~d) V (g ^
-~d))) is undefined because ~((-~g A-~d) V (g A-~d)) is
uncleaned. We have that:
and we find the same values as before.
Conclusion and Further
Work
We have shown that there is an equivalence relation
between ~otal Dempster-Shafer structures and In-
cidence Calculus structures for finite propositional
languages.
Apart from the proof of equivalence itself, this re-
sult makes it possible to restate problems with in-
complete information about probabilities on possi-
ble worlds as problems with partial truth-assignment
functions on formulae and vice-versa, what can be
useful in a knowledge-base design process for pro-
riding different views of one problem, thus helping
the expert to explicitate his knowledge.
Further work includes the analysis of the formal re-
lationship between Incidence Calculus as presented
here and as in the original papers [1,21 - specifi-
cally, we must prove that the reconstruction pre-
sented here corresponds with the rules of h~erence
in the Legal Assignment Finder procedure [i,2] - ~nd
attempting to drop the restrictions of finiteness of
the propositional language and =totalness~ of the
Dempster-Shafer structure.
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